Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme Court Jurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis by Freed, Todd E.
Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse
Beacon of Supreme Court Jurisprudence?:
A Critical Analysis
TODD E. FREED
"'Twill be recorded for a precedent[,] [a]nd many an error by the same
example [w]ill rush into the state.'" I
Shakespeare had concern as to the mischief that might be done in the name
of judicial precedent. In one of his most acrimonious passages, Jonathan Swift
assails the legal system for talkng "special [c]are to record all the [d]ecisions
formerly made against common [j]ustice and the general [r]eason of [m]ankind
[and producing these] under the [n]ame of [p]recedents . as [a]uthorities to
justify the most iniquitous [o]pinions." 2 Swift's diatribe, as well as
Shakespeare's colloquy, is directed at the hallmark of the American common
law system, the venerable doctrine of stare decisis. 3
1WI LLAM SHAKEsPEARE, THE MERH ANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1 (Jay L. Hallo ed.,
Oxford Umv. Press 1993).
2 JONATHAN SwIFr, GuLuvER's TRAVES AND OTHER WRiTINGS 203 (The Modem
Library 1988).
3 The doctrine of stare decisis represents the general proposition that a precedent must be
followed unless there is a cogent reason to overrule it. See Amy L. Padden, Note, Overnding
Decisions in the Supreme Cour: The Role of a Decison's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in
the Application of Stare Decists After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEo. L.J. 1689, 1689 (1994).
The doctrine of stare decisis takes its name from the Latin phrase "stare decisis et non qzaeta
movere" that translates as "stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm." Id. The
doctrine of stare decisis is deeply rooted and prominent in American jurisprudence. See id.
Justice Harlan articulated the basic tenets underpinning the doctrine of stare decisis:
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule
past decisions. Among these are [1] the desirability that the law furnsh a clear guide for
the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against
untoward surprise; [2] the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by
eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and [3] the
necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and
reasoned judgments.
Moragne v. States Manne Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). The Court has noted in past
decisions that stare decisis "is a principle of policy." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991) (quoting Helvermg v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). The doctrine of stare
decisis "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
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Vertical stare decisLs is the policy that a lower court follow the decisions of
higher courts m its jurisdiction.4 Horizontal stare decisis is the rule that a court
follow its past decisions. 5 This Comment will focus on the influence of
horizontal stare decisis on the Supreme Court m the twentieth century 6
Part I discusses the Court's differing treatment of stare decisis depending on
whether a constitutional provision or a statute is at issue. Part II analyzes the
pitfalls inherent m the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Part III
explores the Court's most recent decision m which stare decisis played a
prominent role, Hubbard v United States,7 and briefly contrasts the Hubbard
Court's discussion of statutory stare decisis with the Court's pivotal
constitutional stare decisis analysis m Planned Parenthood v Casey 8 Part IV
examines the Hubbard decision m light of the Patterson v McLean Credit
285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis
promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority. See Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986).
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. See Payne, 501 U.S.
at 827 Many rationales have been proffered to buttress stare decisis including certainty,
equality, efficiency, and the appearance of justice. See Padden, supra, at 1690. Adherence to
stare decisis fosters certainty among individuals and concomitantly allows individuals to order
their affairs with the knowledge that the law will be interpreted in the future the same as it is
interpreted in the present. See id. Stare decisis ensures that "the law will not merely change
erratically" and permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law
rather than in the proclivities of individuals. See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 265.
4 See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 11, 142 U. PA. L. REV 1997, 2024 (1994)
(stating that the American judicial system is based on respect for vertical stare decisis);
Lawrence C. Marshall, Let Congress Do It: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory
Decisis, 88 MIcH. L. REv 177, 237 n.1 (1989) (defining vertical stare decisis as the rule
commanding a lower court to follow the decisions of a higher court in its jurisdiction).
5 See Peter Wesley-Smith, Theones of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in
PRECEDNT iN LAw 81-82 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). In light of vertical stare decisis,
horizontal stare decisis is only applicable as a rule for a court of last resort. See rd.
Furthermore, horizontal stare decisis truly only exists for the Supreme Court because it is the
only court that is not subject to appellate review. See id.
6 See u. at 81-82 (defining horizontal stare decisis as the rule that a court follow its past
precedent). While stare decisis is an inveterate rule, the Court has recognized its power to
overrule a prior decision. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940); see also
James Win. Moore & Robert Stephen Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law
of the Case, 21 TEx. L. REv 514, 523 (1943) (discussing the proper invocation of the
doctrine of stare decisis).
7 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
8 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Union9 traditional rationales for departing from stare decisis and proposes that
the Court, whenever confronted with a stare decisis issue, should apply the
Patterson rationales to determine whether to overrule past Court decisions.
I. STARE DECISIS FRAMEWORK: STATUTORY
VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Try as the Justices might, they cannot seem to treat the children of
American law, constitutional law and statutory law, equally 10 For that matter,
maybe there should be disparate treatment of constitutional law and statutory
law by the Court. The Court might continually reexamine constitutional law to
determine if the prior interpretation is consistent with notions of justice." On
the other hand, the Court having once interpreted a statute could then leave
subsequent statutory interpretation to Congress.12 The Court's differing
application of stare decisis to statutory interpretation and constitutional
interpretation, taken together, demonstrates that the Court has tended to
conform to Justice Brandeis's classic proclamation:
[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its
earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of
better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in
the physical sciences, is appropriate also m the judicial function. 13
9 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
10 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 180-81 (pointing out that the Supreme Court has
applied different stare dectsis analyses based on whether a constitutional question or a statute
is at issue).
11 Justice Brandeis argued in his dissent in Burnet that stare decisis applied with less
vigor in cases involving constitutional issues because in such cases "correction through
legislative action is practically impossible." See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12 Judge Richard A. Posner described Ins scope of stare decisis review of statutes as
follows:
It might be a foolish statute, but (provided it is constitutional-that is, not too foolish, not
vicious, and not contrary to one of the specific prohibitions m the Constitution) if it is
correctly interpreted and applied, the judges have done their job and no more can be
asked.
RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURisPRUDENCE 42 (1990).13 Buret, 285 U.S. at 406-08 (footnotes omtted).
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A. An Analysis of Statutory Stare Dectsis and the Congressional
Acquiescence Theory
When the precedent at issue involves statutory interpretation, the Court has
traditionally articulated and followed a different approach from constitutional
stare decisis. 14 The flip side of the Court's penchant to overrule constitutional
precedents has been its particular reticence to overrule precedents interpreting
statutes. 15 The benchmark decision of the Court delineating its view on
statutory stare decisis was Ene Railroad v. Tompkns. 16 The Ene Court
suggested that it would have been reticent to overrule Swift v. Tyson17 "[i]f only
a question of statutory [interpretation] were involved."18
While the support for a heightened rule for statutory stare decisis has no
formal underpinnings in the law, it does have one main truss of support. The
main truss is congressional acquiescence, 19 a theory which posits that Congress,
by not enacting legislation to reverse the Court's interpretation of a statute, thus
signals its approval of that precedent.20
The traditional justification for the heightened rule of statutory stare decisis
is that Congress's failure to enact legislation reversing a judicial decision signals
Congress's acquiescence to the Court's interpretation of a statute.21 The Court,
when it invokes a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis, refuses to overrule a
statutory precedent even though the Court may be convinced that its earlier
interpretation was wrong.22 The Court has intimated that the burden borne by
14 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 181.
15 See POSNER, supra note 12, at 42-53; see also Richard A. Posner, The Jurspndence
of Skepticism, 86 MicH. L. REv 827, 835 (1988) (pointing out that the Court rarely overrules
its past decisions interpreting a statute).
16 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no general federal common law and that
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable m a state).
17 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (holding that there was a general federal common law
concerning commercial jurisprudence).
18 EneR.R., 304 U.S. at77
19 See William N. Eskndge, Jr., Ovemding Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361,
1381 (1988) (proposing that statutory stare decisis is supported by congressional acquiescence
and illustrates his point by analyzing the baseball antitrust exemption as an inconsistency of
long standing that should be remedied by the Congress and not by the Court); Marshall, supra
note 4, at 184.
2 0 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 184.
21 See id., see also Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation:
Comparative lwmnation of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MicH. L. REv 245, 245
(1995) (advocating that a precedent should not be overruled unless clear error is present).
22 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 186. But see John W Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy
of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643, 1658 (1995) (arguing that stare decisis should be
[57:17671770
STARE DECISIS 9LL THE LIGHTHOUSE
the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is great
where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory interpretation.
23
Considerations of stare decisis have added force in the area of statutory
interpretation because, unlike in the area of constitutional interpretation, the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains uninhibited to alter what
the Court has done.24
B. Three Flaws in the Congressional Acquiescence Theory
However, to explain the reasoning of the congressional acquiescence theory
is to expose its illogic.25 The theory of congressional acquiescence has long
been ostracized for its unrealistic assumptions about the legislative process.
26
The theory of congressional acquiescence is akin to the rhetorical question: If a
tree falls in the woods and no one hears it fall, did it make any noise? If the
Court decides a statutory interpretation issue and no one immediately objects,
does that make it correct?27 The fallacy of a heightened rule for statutory stare
applied when a court is reinterpreting a statute and that stare decisis should be relaxed only m
exceptional circumstances). The Poulos article does not explicitly discuss the exceptional
circumstances, but I argue that the exceptional circumstances are a generalization of the three
Patterson rationales.
23 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). The Johnson Court upheld the
impugned Feres decision, citing the fact that Congress had "recently considered, but not
enacted, legislation" that would have partially overruled Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950). See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686 n.6. The Johnson decision supports the theory that the
burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established statutory precedent is
great because the Court often defers to Congress, as it did in Johnson, instead of undertaking
an independent judicial exammation of the statute. See Posner, supra note 15, at 835.
24 See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424
(1986); illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
25 See Umted States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
26 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 186-91 (arguing that the unrealistic assumptions
include that Congress is aware of all court decisions interpreting statutes enacted by Congress
and that Congress, if it was dissatisfied with the Court's interpretation of a statute, would be
able to overrule the Court by passing a new statute). In fight of the legislative process with
many different committees and agendas, it does not seem unlikely that a member or even a
whole subcommittee might be unaware of the Court's interpretation of a statute.
27 The quest for justice is not a delimited journey; it is similar to the quest for the
definition of obscenity. We may not know what justice is, but we will sure know it when we
see it. Cf. Jacobellis v. Olo, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know
when I see it ").
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decisis bears itself out when it is considered that Congress is affected by many
of the same stumbling blocks affecting all entities m search of perfect
information, that is, nescience, quiescence, and irrelevance. 28
1. Nescience as a Flaw in the Congressional Acquiescence Theory
The principal flaw m interpreting Congress's inaction as an indication of
congressional acquiescence is nescience, which is a lack of information on the
part of members of Congress about Court decisions. 29 "While it is true. . that
a majority of the members of Congress are lawyers, they have not kept up-to-
date on recent legal developments." 30 To tis observation, one might argue that
not all members of Congress need to be informed of Court decisions. Instead,
perhaps only the committee members that drafted statutes that the Court has
erroneously interpreted need to be informed of Court decisions. 31
However, this refrain plays into the hands of the argument against a
heightened rule for statutory stare decisis. If these committee members with
their enormous staffs and liaisons cannot monitor judicial decisions, how can
noncommittee members be expected to be apprised of Court decisions?32 Does
it make sense for the Court to ignore what it thinks was the intent of the entire
Congress that enacted a statute in 1870 just because the members of a
28 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 186.
29 See Id. at 186-90; see also THE AMERiCAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICIONARY 915 (3d
ed. 1993) (defining nescience as the "[a]bsence of knowledge or awareness"). While some
might argue for the use of nontechncal terms, nescience succinctly describes the situation
confronting members of Congress concerning Court decisions.
30 Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REV 587, 609 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also W. iM J. KEEM & MORRIS S.
OGUL, TmE AMERICAN LEGiLATTvE PRocs: CONGRESS AND TiE STATES 420 (5th ed.
1981) (arguing that legislative bodies rarely concern themselves with activities of the courts);
SAMUEL KmiSLOv, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE PoLmcAL PRocss 144 (1965) ("No study
has been undertaken to estimate the number of Court decisions heavily criticized m Congress,
but these would surely constitute a small fraction of the total number. Most never come to the
attention of Congress at all."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87
MICH. L. REV 67, 91 (1988); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987
DuKE L.J. 380, 384 (arguing "that most of the time Congress does not read judicial opinons
and does not know whether courts properly interpret the statute at issue"). i
31 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 186-90. However, this rejomder is a rhetorical
question because often the issue is not whether all members of Congress are unaware of Court
decisions, but whether any of the members of Congress are aware of Court decisions. See
also supra note 30 and accompanying text.32 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 187-89; see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
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committee of the current Congress have not taken measures to overrule a 1976
Court decision interpreting an 1870 enactment?33
The Court's response to the possibility that Congress's acquiescence was a
result of nescience rather than a reasoned analysis has been to attribute more
significance to inaction where there is some evidence, or at least a strong reason
to believe, that a majority of members are aware of the Court decision.34 In the
absence of an actual vote by members, it seems unrealistic to assume that
members of Congress are made more knowledgeable about a Court decision
simply because some committee holds a hearing or some members make
speeches about it. 35
However, tis incremental approach can lead to perverse results. 36 If there
has been complete congressional silence on an issue, the Court is likely to
attribute only minmal significance to Congress's acquiescence, at least as long
as the Court is not convinced that members of Congress must have known
about the decision.37 It is possible, however, that Congress's complete
acquiescence might actually indicate unanimous agreement with the decision, a
factor that would be expected to command considerable respect from the
Court.3 8
On the other hand, if a large number of members sponsor an amendment to
overrule a decision and that amendment is never passed, the Court is likely to
33 The tume period m question relates to the issue before the Court in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Unon, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
34 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629-30 n.7 (1987). The
Johnson Court attributed great weight to Congress's failure to overrule United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Johnson Court believed that Congress was aware of the
decision because Weber was a widely disseminated decision that addressed an important issue
of public interest. See id., see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
35 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 189 (arguing that members of Congress with their
pressing time demands often do not read committee reports and thus are not informed about
Court decisions interpreting statutes). However, this argument fails to address that members
of Congress have other methods, often informal, of receiving information about Court
decisions. See generally RicRD F FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN iN COMMnrrEES 12 (1973)
(stating that members of Congress often monitor judicial decisions through discussions with
their clerks and other members of Congress).
3 6 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 189.
37 See id., see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
38 See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("It is at best treacherous to
find in [c]ongressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law."); Marshall,
supra note 4, at 189. But see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) ("It would
require very persuasive circumstances enveloping [c]ongressional silence to debar this Court
from reexamining its own doctrines."). The preceding parentheticals indicate that if the Court
is determined to examine precedent, congressional acquiescence will not be an impediment.
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attribute great significance to Congress's rnaction.39 Paradoxically, Congress's
unanimous agreement with a decision may command less respect from the
Court than a sharply divided Congress's failure to overrule a decision.40
Therefore, it can be argued that nescience does not support the congressional
acquiescence theory 41
2. Quiescence as a Flaw in the Congressional Acquiescence Theory
The possibility of quiescence is a problem, albeit not the most severe, of
interpreting congressional acquiescence. 42 Quiescence, as applied to Congress,
is the problem of legislative inaction by members of Congress. Often a member
will want to support a statute that would overrule a decision with which the
member disagrees, but for reasons running the gamut, from "belief that the
[statute] is sound m principle but politically inexpedient to be connected with"43
to "belief that the [statute] is sound m principle but defective in material
particulars," 44 will fail to support the statute.
Trying to interpret congressional acquiescence from quiescence is like
reading a tarot card-one can usually find whatever it is for which he or she is
looking.45 Members may have many reasons for failing to bring to the floor
legislation that they support, such as dealmaking with another member and
recognizing that political expediency requires that propounding the statute
would not be greeted favorably by other members.46
One cannot decipher the intent of Congress from the fact that a statute was
never brought to the floor, died in committee, or was defeated in a floor vote. 47
The point is not that congressional quiescence is wholly superfluous in
determining congressional acquiescence; as a matter of logic, it is pertinent.48
3 9 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 189-90.
40 See supra text accompanying note 39.
41 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 186-90.
42 See id. at 190.
43 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems m the
Making and Application of Law 1393 (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
44 Id.
45 See itd. It is very difficult to interpret silence as an indication of one's beliefs. Cy.
United States v. Hoosier, 542 F.2d 687, 688 (6th Cir. 1976). The court discussed the problem
of interpreting silence in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B), which is an
admission by a party-opponent, and held that more than mere silence was needed to interpret
the appellant's statement. See itd.
46 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 43, at 1393-1401.
47 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 191; see also supra text accompanying notes 39 and
46.
48 While quiescence is not determinative of congressional agreement, it is a factor for the
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However, this pertinence does not afortion demonstrate that the probability of
congressional agreement is sufficient to support any form of a presumption of
congressional acquiescence. 49 Therefore, quiescence is inexact and does not
lend support to the congressional acquiescence theory 50
3. Irrelevance as a Flaw in the Congressional Acquiescence Theory
The final flaw of the congressional acquiescence theory is irrelevance. The
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that "[i]t is the intent of the Congress
that enacted [the statute at issue] that controls."' 51 The Court has generally
followed an ongmalist model of statutory construction by attempting to
understand what the Congress that enacted the statute at issue intended to
accomplish by the language it chose. 52 With this onginalist model in mind, how
do you understand the intent of a Congress that passed a statute in 1870 by
examining the congressional acquiescence of a Congress seated in 1976?53 To
understand the intent of a Congress, one must search the legislative history
54 of
the statute, contemporaneous remarks of legislators, and early Court
interpretations of the statute.55
In light of the congressional acquiescence theory's shortcomings of
nescience, quiescence, and irrelevance, the congressional acquiescence theory
tends not to offer support for a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis. 56
Court to consider when deciding a statutory stare decisis issue. See generally Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1976). The Court generally attributes significance to
decisions where Congress has actually defeated legislation m response to the Court's earlier
interpretation of a statute. See u.; see also supra text accompanying notes 39 and 46.
4 9 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 191.
5 0 See Id.
51 Mackey v. Lamer Collection Agency Serv. Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 840 (1988) (quoting
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977)).
52 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 193; see also Posner, supra note 15, at 838 (arguing
that the best way to determine congressional intent is to examine the plain language of a
statute). See generally Antonm Scalia, The Rue of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. C. L.
REV 1175, 1184 (examining the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation).
53 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 n.11 (1976) (examining the
constitutionality of a statute passed m 1870).
54 Legislative history is the compilation of records, reports, hearings, and debates
leading up to the enactment of a statute. See BiACK's LAw DICrIONARY 900 (6th ed. 1990).
55 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 193.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 11-55.
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C. An Analysis of Constitutional Stare Decisis
The Court traditionally has not applied stare decisis as strictly in
constitutional cases as m nonconstitutional cases. 57 However, overruling a
constitutional precedent "is a matter of no small import, for 'the doctrine of
stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law "'58 The Court has
held that any departure from the doctrine of constitutional stare decisis demands
"special justification."' 59 However, stare decisis concerns are at their zenith in
decisions involving property and contract rights regulated by statutes. 6° The
Rehnquist Court, by its inordinate support for statutory stare decisis, has
effectively relegated constitutional stare decisis to second-class status.61 Chief
Justice Rehnquist went so far as to state "that precedents affecting individual
[constitutional] rights [are] of lesser importance. than statutory
precedents." 62
The Court has reasoned that adherence to precedent is least compelling in
constitutional cases because correction through the legislature is virtually
unattainable. 63 However, tu reasoning is inapposite and stare decisis should
remain a potent doctrine in those constitutional cases denying individual rights
because Congress can still provide statutory protection where once it was
constitutional. 64 Provided the alternative of statutory protection from Congress,
57 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurrng); Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 543 (1962); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Padden, supra note 3, at 1723. Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited Payne for ins belief that stare decisis caries less force in constitutional decisionmaking.
See id. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to imply that constitutional error was
enough by itself to demand the Court to reexamine a decision, he examined the traditional
rationales for departing from stare decisis and found that such a departure was justified in
Payne. See id.
58 Payne, 501 U.S. at 842 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Welsh v. Texas Dep't of
Highways, Pub. Tramp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987)).
59 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Arizona
v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)); infra Part IV
60 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
61 See Bennet L. Gershman, Judicial 'Conservatism', N.Y. L.J., June 21, 1995, at 2.
62Id.
63 See Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee: A "Stunning Ipse Dixit, " 8 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETmIcs & PuB. PoL'Y 165, 178 (1994). But see infra note 64.
64 See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 180-81. Congress, by enacting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, provided protection to certain classes of individuals against discrimination
based on many different factors. Congress made Title VII applicable to areas that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not address. See generally Clara J. Montanan, Note, Supervisor
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the Court is not the only avenue short of constitutional amendment for
protecting individual rights, and stare decisis should apply as it would in the
statutory context. 65
II. PITFALLS OF STARE DEcIsis
The doctrine of stare decisis can trap the myopic practitioner fixated on
archaic decisions, as well as the visionary in search of a utopian legal system
devoid of past iniquitous decisions. 66 The doctrine of stare decisis is a
compromise between the past and the future.67 As Justice Traynor68 phrased
the quandary, "If hasty displacement of precedents69 should be discouraged,
there should be corresponding discouragement of ritual perpetuation of a
moribund precedent." 70
Liability Under TItle VI: A "Feel Good" Judiaal Decson, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 351, 359
(1996) (arguing that Title VII is applicable to areas of discrimination that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not address).
65 See supra text accompanying note 64.
66 See Reigious Liberty and the Bill of Rights: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judicary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1995)
(statement of Professor Michael S. Paulsen of the University of Minnesota Law School).
Professor Michael S. Paulsen warned that strictly adhering to stare decisis can lead to
inequitable results. A court, instead of correcting an iniquitous decision, blindly follows the
decision because of stare decisis. Ultimately, tis causes more damage to the justice system
due to unfairness perceptions than overruling the decision would have caused in stability
perceptions. See id., see also Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Inplicit Collusion?: Toward
a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Dectsis, 24 SzroN HALL L. REv. 736, 804 n.26 (1993).
67 The Court has been reluctant to overrule past decisions, even where it is clear that a
majority of the Justices no longer believe that those decisions embody correct interpretations
of the law. See Paulsen, supra note 66, at 3. The Court, instead of overruling these erroneous
decisions, distinguishes them. See td. The result is a comatose body of law that is lingering in
its death throes waiting to die. The consequence is frequently confusion. See id. Finally,
because the Court grants certiorari m less than 1% of cases, the result is that many clearly
erroneous past Court decisions are perpetuated under the mantra of stare decisis. See id.
Ironically, these erroneous past Court decisions gain strength over time similar to the old
wives' tale that if you say something enough times, it may come true.
68 Cluef Justice Traynor was a former justice of the California Supreme Court.
69 Precedent is defined as "[c]ourts attempt[ing] to decide cases on the basis of principles
established m prior cases." BLACK'S LAw DicrioNARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990). See Ronald
Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter) Majoritanan Institution: Misperceptions of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnqutst Courts, 1994 Dar. C.L. RFv. 1 (assuming that stare decisis
is the same as following precedent).
70 Roger J. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and LImtts of Appellate
Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REv 255, 263 (footnote added). The Court has explicitly overruled its
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The spasmodic way in which the current Justices of the Court and the legal
profession mampulate stare decisis is telling.71 Frequently, stare decisis is
paraded out in defense of decisions that could be supported on wholly
independent grounds.72 At other times, stare decisis seems to be conveniently
prior decisions on innumerable occasions. See, e.g., Monell v Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), overruling United States
v. Arnold, Schwun & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Lodge 76, International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), overruling
International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); Braden
v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), overruling Ahrens v. Clark, 335
U.S. 188 (1948); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972), overruling
Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195
(1962); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131
(1934); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896).
These divergences from prior Court decisions do not mean that the Court has been
apathetic to stare decisis, but only that stare decisis is a "principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula." Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 241 (quoting Helveruig v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). "Tihe careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight
path of stare decisis in [the Court's] past [has] occurred for articulable reasons, and only
when the Court has felt obliged 'to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with
facts newly ascertained.'" Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Respect for
the Court must fall when the bar and the public come to comprehend that nothing that has
been decided in prior adjudication has force in pending litigation. See Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
71 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 177 Justice Frankfurter admonished "that stare decsis
is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,
however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior
doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience."
Helvenng, 309 U.S. at 119.
Remaining true to an 'intrinsically sounder' doctrine established in prior cases better
serves the values of stare decisis than would following a more recently decided case
mconsistent with the decisions that came before it; the latter course would simply
compound the error and would likely make the unjustified break from previously
established doctrine complete.
Id.
72 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 177 The legal profession needs to be ever vigilant that
stare decisis does not become the lap dog of a languid judiciary. But see Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (where Justice O'Connor faced the dilemma of whether to
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ignored as an antiquated, rhetorical device that long ago served its purpose.73 In
the 1960s, when the Warren Court's power was at its zenith, conservative
academicians repeatedly attacked the Warren Court's propensity to overrule
precedent. 74 Under the Rehnquist Court, by contrast, the liberal critics are
vituperating the conservative majorities of the Court for failing to adhere to
stare decisis.75 The friends of stare decisis, in the main, are determined by the
needs of the moment.76
The uncertainty about the contemporary status of stare decisis is a
byproduct of the inexactitude of the doctrine of stare decisis itself.77 Stare
decisis allows the Court to overrule prior decisions where there is some
"special justification,"78 a concept that the Court has never fully enunciated. 79
affirm Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), solely on constitutional grounds or to buttress the
plurality decision by also relying on stare decisis). Courts must balance the inclination to
substitute solely the doctrine of stare decisis with examining independent legal arguments to
affirm a precedent.
73 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 177
74 See id. at 177-78; see, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwnght, The 'An" of
Overriding, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv 211 (discussing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1969),
overruling precedent); Philip B. Kurland, Stare Decisis: lWzat is Past? and What is
Prologue?, 78 HARv L. REv 143, 169-75 (1964). During the 16 year reign of the Warren
Court, 63 decisions were overruled, and during the 17 years of the Burger Court, 61
decisions were overruled. See Gershman, supra note 61, at 2. This equates to about four
overrulings a year, which is well within the established bounds of the Court during the
twentieth century. See id.
75 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 178. Professor Burt Neubome of New York Umversity
School of Law observes that "[a] judicial activist is an ideologue with five votes [and] what's
disturbing is the hypocrisy with which [C]hief [J]usuce [Rehnqmst] has waged a lifelong
war against judicial activism and then does it once he gets five votes." Marcia Coyle,
Complete Control, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S2. See also Charles J. Cooper, Stare
Dectsis: Precedent and Pnnciple in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV 401,
401 (1988) (Charles J. Cooper rhetorically asks whether it is not "amusing that liberals, who
only recently have perceived the profound value of 'stability of the law,' have taken to
lecturing conservatives on what it takes to be a true conservative?"). But see Coyle, supra, at
52 (Richard Willard, a Court litigator at Steptoe & Johnson's Dismct of Columbia office,
counters that "[tihere's no doctrine of judicial restraint that requires conservative [J]ustices to
go along with precedents no matter how wrong they think those decisions may be.").
76 See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 182.
77 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 179.
78 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Umon, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Arizona
v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)); see also Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save this
Postmodem Court: The Death of Necessity and the Transformation of the Supreme Court's
Overriling Rhetoric, 63 U. CmN. L. REv 1119, 1159 (1995) (discussing the concept of
special justification in Rumsey).
79 See Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212 (stating that any transgression from stare decisis
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Because of the imprecise rules for the deployment of stare decisis, "it is often
impossible to assess whether a decision has or has not been faithful to the stare
decisis principle."'80 The decline of stare decisis, like the decline of the Roman
empire, is m full view of all citizens, yet none are taking up arms to defend this
cornerstone of justice.81
Once some Justices begin to treat precedent lightly, other Justices will be
inclined to refuse to follow the dictates of past decisions.82 The larger issue that
can denigrate the doctrine of stare decisls is that once one majority of Justices
overrules decisions of a previous majority, it is almost impossible to demand
that successor majorities respect their predecessors' precedents.8 3
In some respects, these problems are inevitable in a judicial system that
attempts to balance the stability of the law with the need to overrule some
perncious precedents. 84 Unless Americans are willing to abide by decisions
such as Plessy v Ferguson,85 or are willing to rely on a constitutional
amendment to overrule them, stare decisis cannot be immutable. 86 However,
once an absolute rule of stare decisis is dismissed, there is no objective
demands special justification; however, the Court fails to define special justification); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (implying that deviation from stare decisis requires
special justification but does not define parameters of special justification); Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) (failing to define special justification).
80 Marshall, supra note 4, at 179 (foomote omitted).
81 See Id.
82 See id., see also Cooper, supra note 75, at 404. Charles J. Cooper states that stare
decisis "is inherently subjective, and few judges can resist the natural temptation to
manipulate it and its avowed office is to shelter error from correction." Id. TIis
statement is a warning to the judiciary that once precedent is altered or distinguished, it loses
its precedential value, and ergo, no longer is a basis for future decisions. See id.
83 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 179; see also Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say
Matters" Teague and New Rues, 61 U. Cm. L. REV 423, 423 (1994) ("The Court is
wearing away at the power of precedent itself, strpping prior cases of all persuasive force
beyond their particular factual contexts.").
84 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 179,
85 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (requiring separate but equal accommodations aboard passenger
trams for African-Americans). However, separate but equal accommodations are usually
anything but equal. See generally Sara L. Mandelbaum, A Judicial Blow for "Jane Crowism"
at The Citadel in Faulkner v. Jones, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv 3, 4 (1994) (arguing that the
program accommodations at Mary Baldwin College, a female only military institution was
separate but not equal to the male cadets' program and accommodations at VMI).
86 See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 19, at 1361 (stating that while stare decisis supports the
constancy of judicial decisions as a path to preserving public respect for the judiciary and to
safeguard the reliance interests of persons, these decisions must occasionally yield and
change). "Stare decisis is not an inexorable command." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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yardstick for measuring adherence to the rule of precedent. 87
III. THE COURT'S RECENT TREATMENT OF STARE DECISIS:
FROM P.ANNED PARENTHooD TO HUBBARD
A. The Court's Treatment of Constitutional Stare Dectsis in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,88 Justice O'Connor89 wrote at length
about the importance of stare decisis and ultimately upheld Roe v Wade based
on constitutional stare decisis.90 Justice O'Connor's stare decisis analysis began
with the observation that "no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed
each issue afresh in every case that raised it." 91 She weighed a woman's
reliance interest on the right to terminate her pregnancy developed over the
eighteen years since Roe against "whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine. " 92 In a lengthy discussion of the role of stare decisis in Roe, Justice
O'Connor held for the Court that based on the doctrine of stare decisLs, the
correct decision was to reaffirm Roe, but redefine Roe's parameters. 93
Justice O'Connor's opinion is significant for its lengthy discussion of stare
decisis in a constitutional interpretation. However, Justice O'Connor seemed to
follow the Court's past statutory stare decisis analysis 94 in holding that Roe's
reliance interests outweighed any subsequent changes in the facts and law, as
the Roe Court envisaged both.95
87 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 180.
88 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis requires reaffirmance
of the essential holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognizing a woman's right to
have an abortion before fetal viability).
8 9 Justice O'Connor joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter wrote the plurality opinion
dealing with stare decisLs and its impact on the Roe decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 840.
90 See id. at 861.
91 Id. at 854.
92Id. at855.
93 See Id. at 869-70.
94 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
95 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61.
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B. The Court's Treatment of Statutory Stare Decisis in Hubbard v.
United States
In Hubbard v United States,96 Justice Stevens ignored the Court's previous
statutory stare decisis maxim that provided "considerations of stare dectsis
weigh heavily in the area of statutory [interpretation], where Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." 97 The facts of Hubbard
seemed to present a clear application of United States v. Bramblett,9s the
Court's forty year precedent holding that a bankruptcy court is a
"department of the United States" 99 within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. In the years since Bramblett, legal scholars and the bar have been
dissatisfied with the stifling effect this decision has had on courtroom freedom
of expression. i0 In response to this concern, many lower federal courts crafted
an exception to the statute's applicability by forging a doctrine called the
judicial function exception. 10 1 The judicial function exception provided an
exclusion for false statements and similar misconduct occurring during the
court's "'administrative' or 'housekeeping' functions." 102
Instead of endorsing the judicial function exception that limited Bramblett's
holding, the Court took the unprecedented step of overruling Bramblett.03 The
unexpectedness of the decision caught many Court observers by surprise
because most legal scholars believed that Bramblett, even with the judicial
function exception, was a workable decision. 104 The Court's fractured Hubbard
decision announced the judgment in a plurality opinion that was less telling for
the insipid subject matter of the statute than for the decision's complete
96 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (plurality opinion). Mr. Hubbard was indicted under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for falsehoods in unsworn papers filed m the Bankruptcy Court. See u. He
was convicted after the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
relying on United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), instructed the jury that a
bankruptcy court is a "department of the United States" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. See d. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and also
held that the judicial function exception did not exist. See id.
97 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
98 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
99 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983 & Supp. V 1988).
100 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1758.
101 See Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (developing the
judicial function exception because the court of appeals was troubled by the potential sweep of
the statute).
102 Id. at 237
103 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765.
104 See Id.
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abandonment of past statutory stare decisis analysis.10 5 Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist complained in his dissent that the majority jettisoned a forty year
precedent despite the plurality's admission that the Bramblett Court's reading of
the statute was "not completely inplausible."' °6 The following is a summary
and analysis of Hubbard's plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions dealing
with statutory stare decisis.
1. Justice Stevens and "Intervening Development of the Law"
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the Court, concluded that the
statute, which crimmalizes false statements and similar misconduct occurring
"in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States," 107 did not apply to false statements made in judicial proceedings.10 8
Justice Stevens began with a plain language interpretation 1°9 of the statute
focusing on the words "department or agency "110 Justice Stevens concluded
that because a bankruptcy court was neither a "department [n]or agency"111
within the meaning of the statute, the statute did not apply to false statements
made in judicial proceedings." 2 The need for a judicial function exception
became extraneous after Justice Stevens delivered the part of the opinion that a
majority of the Justices joined, which stated that the statute did not extend to the
Judicial Branch. 113
The Court's uneasiness with statutory stare decisLs analysis bore itself out in
that no one opinion garnered enough support to speak for a majority of the
Justices. 114 In part IV of the decision, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Ginsberg and Breyer, began their statutory stare decisis analysis with a review
of lower federal court decisions developing the judicial function exception. 115
Justice Stevens seized on the early history of the judicial function exception,
which was forged mn Morgan v. United States only seven years after Bramblett
105 See u. passim. The opion also included a concurrence and a dissent that both dealt
with statutory stare decisis. See Ad. at 1765-69.
106 See . at 1766.
107 Id. at 1756 (citng 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983 & Supp. V 1988)).
108 See id. at 1765.
109 See id. at 1757-58.
110 See id. at 1756 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
I1 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
112 See Id. at 1765.
113 See Id.
114 See Id. at 1754.
115 See id. at 1761.
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was decided.116 Justice Stevens noted that the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit that had decided Morgan was concerned with the potential
sweep of the statute.117 Particularly because the statute prohibited concealment
and covering up of material facts, as well as intentional falsehoods,118 the court
of appeals pondered whether the statute might be interpreted to criminalize
conduct that fell within the scope of reasonable advocacy 119 Justice Stevens
went on to document the extensive entrenchment of the judicial function
exception in the lower federal courts. 120
In part V of the decision, Justice Stevens focused on the difficult statutory
stare deciss issue the case presented. 121 Justice Stevens began by noting that
"[i]t is . wise judicial policy to adhere to rules announced in earlier
cases." 1 2 2 Justice Stevens next trotted out the statutory stare decisis mantra that
respect for precedent is strongest in the context of statutory interpretation
because, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative
power is implicated, and Congress has the power to amend what the Court has
116 See Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
117 See id. at 237
118 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983 & Supp. V 1988).
119 "Does a defendant 'cover up a material fact' when he pleads not guilty9 Does an
attorney 'cover up' when he moves to exclude hearsay testimony he knows to be true, or
when he makes a summation on behalf of a client he knows to be guilty"" Morgan, 309 F.2d
at 237 (alteration m original). The Morgan court further stated:
We are certain that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended the statute to
include traditional trial tactics within the statutory terms conceals or covers up. We hold
only, on the authority of the Supreme Court construction, that the statute does apply to
the type of action with which appellant was charged, action which essentially involved
the 'administrative' or 'housekeeping' functions, not the 'judicial' machinery of the
court.
Id.
120 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1761-62; see also United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d
760, 766 (1991) (the judicial function exception was first articulated nearly 30 years ago);
United States v. Mayer, 775 F.2d 1387, 1390 (1985) (per cunam) (recognizing the judicial
function exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by appellate decisions since 1962); United States v.
D'Amato, 507 F.2d 26, 30 (1974) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not apply to a
conviction arising out of a false affidavit offered in the course of a civil lawsuit).
121 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1763.
122 Id. Justice Stevens went on to quote Justice Cardozo, reminding us that "It]he labor
of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)).
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done. 123 However, after paying homage to statutory stare decisis, Justice
Stevens then ignored the doctrine in his stare decisis analysis in Hubbard.124
Justice Stevens posed the stare decisis issue in Hubbard as presenting two
conflicting paths.125 On the one hand, stare decisis counsels adherence to the
statutory interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 m Bramblett;126 on the other hand,
stare decisis argues in countenance of retaining the body of law that has limited
the breadth of Bramblett.127 Justice Stevens noted that it would be difficult to
achieve both paths simultaneously 128 Justice Stevens expounded that if the
word "department" 129 included the federal courts, as the Bramblett Court
held, 13 the judicial function exception could not be squared with the language
of the statute. 131 "A court is a court-and is part of the Judicial Branch-
whether it is functioning in a housekeeping or judicial capacity." 132
Conversely, Bramblett could not remain good law if the Court adopted the
judicial function exception. 133
Justice Stevens justified overruling Bramblett, and its forty years of
statutory precedent, "because of a highly unusual 'intervening development of
the law"' 134 and also because "of the absence of significant reliance interests in
adhering to Bramblett."1 35 According to Justice Stevens, "the highly unusual
'intervening development of the law"' was the judicial function exception.1 36
However, the judicial function exception had never achieved the status of an
intervening development of the law 137 At most, one could argue that the
judicial function exception was a limited exception applicable only to a lower
123 See td.
124 See id. at 1763-65.
125 See Id. at 1763.
126 See Id.
127 See Id.
128 See Id.
129 See It. at 1756 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983 & Supp. V 1988)).
130 See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955).
131 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1763 (stating that the judicial function exception has no
vitality if the Court interprets 18 U.S.C. § 1001 so that it does not extend to conduct
occurring m the lower federal courts).
132 Id.
133 See itd. The Court dismissed the government's suggestion that a reconsideration of
Bramblett was not fairly included in the question on wuch the Court granted certiorari. See
td. at n.12.
134 Id. at 1764 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).135 Id.
136 See Id.
137 See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173 (discussing the evolution of an intervening
development of the law).
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federal court's "'administrative' or 'housekeeping' function."138 Justice Stevens
bestowed upon the judicial function exception the status of a "competing legal
doctrine, ' 139 and thus gave to the judicial function exception the legitimacy of a
settled body of law 140 Justice Stevens stated that the reliance interests on
Bramblett were "notably modest" 141 because of the judicial function exception.
However, as noted above, once the judicial function exception was shown in its
true colors as an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, not as an intervening
development of the law, 142 Justice Stevens's premise for overruling Bramblett
lost its efficacy Justice Stevens did not address the issue of congressional
acquiescence or unacceptable consequences of past decisions applying
Bramblett, nor did he attempt to examine past legislative history from the
Congress that adopted the statute to determine its intentions.
143
2. Justice Scalia and the "Do Over"
Justice Scalia filed a concurrence144 on the statutory stare decisis issue
presented by 18 U.S.C. § 1001.145 Justice Scalia began by noting the
importance of stare decisis to the American way of life.i146 "Who ignores [stare
decisis] must give reasons, and reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that
the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine
at all)." 147 However, Justice Scalia did not follow Ins own words.
Justice Scalia avowed that Ins support for overruling Bramblett was due to
138 See Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962); supra text
accompanying note 120.
139 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173).
140 See Id.
141 See id. Justice Stevens only briefly supports Ins assertion that Bramblett's reliance
interests are "notably modest." See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, chastises
Justice Stevens for Ins superficial examination of Bramblett's reliance interests. See id. at
1768 (Relnquist, J., dissenting).
142 See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173 (discussing that an exception to a statute's
applicability in a particular instance does not imbue that exception with the status of an
intervening development of the law, but instead it means that the statute does not apply in all
situations where on the face of the statute it would; and noting that an exception to a statute
should not be treated as an intervening development of the law).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 55.
144 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in parts I-rI and VI of the plurality opinion, as
well as in his concurrence in the judgment of the Court, was joined by Justice Kennedy. See
Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765-66 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145 See id. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring).
146 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
147 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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its unacceptable consequences; however, he did not cite one decision where
mischief from the statute lay 148 While Justice Scalia did dismiss forty years of
precedent with his concurrence m the judgment, he was more up front about it
than Justice Stevens. 149 Justice Scalia did not hide behind the stare decisis
nemesis of an intervening development of the law 150 He avowedly stated that
Bramblett had unacceptable consequences.151 He believed that the statute had
no application to the Judicial Branch, and therefore, that the judicial function
exception was irrelevant. 152
However, never has candidness been a panacea for careful judicial
thought. 153 Justice Scalia surmised that had the Bramblett Court known the
error of its ways it would have held that the statute did not apply to the Judicial
Branch. 154 He next addressed the judicial function exception and its place m the
stare decisis analysis. 155 He acknowledged that if the judicial function exception
was adopted by the Court, then the need for overruling Bramblett would
dissipate. 156 However, he quickly cast aside this solution and instead overruled
Bramblett as inconsistent with the statute's language. 157
Justice Scalia declared that if the judicial function exception was adopted by
the Court, it would not further one of the main goals of stare decisis, "avoiding
'an arbitrary decision m the courts.'" 1 58 Again, Justice Scalia did not show how
148 See id. (stating that Bramblett produced unacceptable consequences; however, he
failed to note any of these supposed unacceptable consequences).
149 Justice Scalia forthrightly stated ls dissatisfaction with the Bramblet decision,
unlike Justice Stevens who attempted to lde his dissatisfaction with the Bramblett decision
behind an incomplete stare decisis analysis.
150 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
151 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
153 See CARDOZO, supra note 122, at 152.
154 However, saying something enough times does not make it true. Justice Scalia offers
no legal authority for this hypothesis and indeed, this hypothesis cuts against Justice Scalia's
stare decisis guidepost that "reasons go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled
opinion was wrong." Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765. The Bramblet Court's holding
concerning the applicability of the statute to the lower federal courts may be wrong, but
Justice Scalia has failed to show that the decision has had unacceptable consequences. At
most, Justice Scalia can show a judicial policy of lirmting Bramblett's applicability in lower
federal courts to the judicial functions of its courts, as opposed to the administrative or
housekeeping functions. See Morgan v. Umted States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962).15 5 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156 See Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 See id. (Scalia, J. concurring); see also ul. at 1757-58. Some support exists for
Justice Scalia's view that "department or agency" does not include the lower federal courts.
See id.
158 See Id. at 1766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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adopting the judicial function exception would have lead to arbitrary decisions
in federal courts. 159 Justice Scalia concluded Ins concurring opinion with a brief
discussion of the other goal of stare decisis, "preserving justifiable
expectations." 160 However, he summarily asserted that justifiable expectations
would not have been threatened if Bramblett were overruled. 16 1 He stated that
"[t]hose whose reliance [interests] on Bramblett induced them to tell the truth
have no claim on our solicitude."162 He went on to provide that while a
few miscreants may go free, it is a small price to pay for overruling this
troublesome decision. 163 He seemed to be settling m on the nefarious aspects of
the Bramblett decision that the judicial function exception attempted to deal
with, namely potential harm to trial advocacy, 164 and to be willing to forego the
positive aspect of the decision, namely requiring participants to be truthful
during the course of a judicial proceeding.165
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist and the True Believers
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent 66 called the plurality to task for replacing
"Bramblett's plausible, albeit arguably flawed, interpretation of the statute with
its own 'sound' reading." 167 He gave short shrift to the reasons offered by
Justice Stevens in part V of his plurality opinion and the justification offered by
Justice Scalia m his concurring opinion. 168
Chief Justice Rehnquist cluded Justice Stevens for his "intervening
development [of] the law"'169 assault on stare decisLs and correctly pointed out
159 See t. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia offers no citation to support Ins
assertion. See id.
160 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).161 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
162 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that persons should not be rewarded for
something that they were legally obligated to do).
163 See Ad. (Scalia, J., concurring).
164 See ut. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 1761-62 (Justice Stevens discussing
the possible nefarious ramifications of the Bramblet decision on the defense bar's trial
strategies.).
165 See Id. at 1766 (Scalia, J., concurnng).
166 Chief Justice Rehnqust was joined in Ins dissent by Justices O'Connor and Souter.
See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter are the only two
Justices in the Casey and Hubbard decisions that voted to uphold both Roe and Bramblett
based on the doctrine of stare decisis.
167 Id. at 1766-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
168 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169 See Itd. at 1766 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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that Justice Stevens was using lower federal court opinions as the "basis for
disavowing, not the aberrant court of appeals decisions, but, mtrabile dictu our
own decision." 170 He admonished the plurality that this line of reasoning, quite
apart from supporting the doctrine of stare decisis, actually subverted the very
foundation on which stare decisis was built, "a hierarchical court system." 171
He also took the plurality to task for its belief that there had been no reliance
interests on the Bramblett decision.172
He stated that the Hubbard decision departed radically from the previous
application of the intervening development of the law challenge to stare
decisis, 173 whereby "intervening development [of] the law" meant that a court
of appeals had incorrectly interpreted a Court decision. 174 He next described
the Court's certiorari process and the dearth of cases the Court could select.175
He then went on to delineate the ramifications of this highly selective
process.' 76 He warned of the inducement to courts of appeals that Hubbard
sent: if a lower court was unhappy with a Court decision, then that court could
build a body of case law contrary to the Court's, and this contrary body of case
law could serve as a ground for overruling the Court decision. 177 The
17 0 Id., see also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 (Stare decisis is "a basic self-governng
principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of
fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary
discretion."); THE FEDERALISr No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge
ed., 1888) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the Courts, it is indispensible that [judges]
should be bound by strict rules and precedents ")
171 Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766 (Rehnqtust, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.172 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
173 See Id. at 1767 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972). The Shearson and Andrews decisions delineate that intervening
developments concern the decisional law of the Supreme Court, not of the lower federal
courts. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1767 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1767 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 743-44 (1977) (holding that the Court would refuse to follow a
line of lower federal court decisions that had carved out an exception from one of the Court's
precedents).
17 5 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1767 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
17 6 See Id. (Rehnqtust, C.J., dissenting).
17 7 See Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This doomsday prediction is not likely to
happen. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist does point out that the Court's power is based on
respect for the Court's decisions, and that if this respect is undermined, then judges of the
courts of appeals may be less inclined to follow unpopular Court precedents with wich they
disagree. See ul. This could result m a collapse of vertical stare decisis and the stability that
the American justice system has known for over two hundred years. See ul.; see also supra
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unfortunate message Justice Stevens's transmogrified intervening development
of the law theory sent was one of irreverence for the venerable concept of stare
decisis and a lack of respect for the Court.178
Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the plurality's second justification in
defense of its decision to overrule Bramblett, namely that there has been no
reliance interest on the Bramblett decision. 179 He pointed out that just because
the government had expressed a preference for proceeding under statutes other
than 18 U.S.C. § 1001180 did not mean that the government had forfeited any
claim or right of reliance to prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.181
He chastised Justice Scalia for not following the Court's statutory stare
decisis view that "[t]he opinion of one [Jiustice that another's view of a statute
was wrong, even really wrong, does not overcome the institutional advantages
conferred by adherence to stare decists in cases where the wrong is fMlly
redressable by a coordinate branch of government."1 82 Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded by iterating his belief that the judicial function exception was not an
intervening development of the law sufficient to warrant overruling a forty-year
precedent. 183
IV. THE PATTERSON TRADITIONAL RATIONALES FOR DEPARTING FROM
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECIsIs AS APPLIED TO HUBBARD
The Court m Patterson v McLean Credit Union184 formulated three
traditional rationales to be applied when a court examines a stare decisis issue.
The three traditional rationales, any one of which is sufficient to depart from
the doctrine of statutory or constitutional stare decisis, are as follows:
(1) Whether the decision has "been undermined by subsequent changes or
development [of] the law"; 185 (2) whether the decision "may be a positive
text accompanying note 4.
178 SeeHubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1767
179 See It. at 1768.
180 See id. at 1756 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983)).
181 See ud. at 1768.
182 Id. at 1769.
183 See Id. (stating that "Bramblett governs this case, and if the rule of that case is to be
overturned it should be at the hands of Congress, and not of this Court"). But see supra text
accompanying notes 31 and 55 (explaining that congressional acquescence may not be a valid
theory on which to base congressional support for a Court decision because Congress may be
unaware of the Court decision, or Congress may be unable to overrule the Court decision due
to legislative postuing or lack of votes).
184 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
185 Id. at 173.
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detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, either because of inherent
confusion created by an unworkable decision or because the decision poses
a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in other
laws"; 186 or (3) whether the decision has become "outdated and after being
'tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice
or with the social welfare.' 187
The Court in Hubbard did not address the three traditional rationales for
departing from stare decisis as formulated by the Court just six years before m
Patterson.188 If the Court had applied these three traditional rationales for
departing from stare decisis, it is possible that the Court would have decided
Hubbard differently 189
A. The First Patterson Rationale
The first rationale, whether the decision has "been undermined by
subsequent changes or development [of] the law," 190 presents the question
posed by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent: upon whose reference point are
supposed subsequent changes or development of the law recogmzed? 191
If the analysis proceeds under Justice Stevens's plurality opinion, 192 then
ample support exists for concluding that Bramblett has been undermined by
subsequent decisions. 193 However, if the analysis proceeds under Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, then little or no support exists for overruling Bramblett.19 4
186 Id. (internal ctatons omitted) (footnote ormtted).
187 Id. at 174 (footnote omitted) (quoting Runyon v. McCraty, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).18 8 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1754 passim.
189 While it is difficult to isolate and change one factor (stare decisis analysis) and draw
conclusions from that change, the fractured decision in Hubbard evidences that the support for
overruling Bramble was not especially strong. If the Hubbard Court had undertaken a
thorough examination of stare decisis by applying the Patterson rationales to Bramblett, it is
likely that Bramblett would not have been overruled.
190 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173.
191 See supra Part m.B.3 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's position that analysis of
intervening developments should be from the Court's reference point).
192 See supra Part lll.B.1 (discussing Justice Stevens's position that intervening
developments should encompass lower federal court decisions).
193 See cases cited supra note 120.
194 While Chief Justice Rehnquist did not use the exact language of the Patterson
decision, he did correctly point out that the "intervening development of the law" exception to
following the doctrine of stare decisis depends on intervening developments in the case law of
the Court, not of lower federal courts. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766; see also Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 743-44 (1977) (refusing to follow a line of lower federal
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The key to analyzing this conundrum is to examine what court decided the
precedent at issue. If, as in Bramblelt, the Supreme Court decided the case,
then it should be the Court that decides whether intervening developments of
its case law have sufficiently sapped the strength of the precedent to allow the
precedent's overruling.
Applying the first rationale, whether the decision has "been undermined by
subsequent changes or development [of] the law," 195 to the analysis of
Bramblett as developed by Chief Justice Rehnquist does not lead to a departure
from the doctrine of stare decisis. The first rationale depends on intervening
developments to sap strength from the vitality of a precedent. However, the
Court is a court of last resort, 196 and therefore, as a matter of policy, does not
look to lower court decisions for guidance. 197 The Court has not addressed the
issue of whether a bankruptcy court is a department of the United States 98
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 since Bramblett. Therefore, under the
first rationale of Patterson, no intervening developments have occurred since
Bramblett sufficient to warrant departing from stare decisis and overruling
Bramblett.
B. The Second Patterson Rationale
The second Patterson rationale for departing from stare decisis is whether
the decision is "a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law,
either because of an inherent confusion created by an unworkable
decision or because the decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of
important objectives embodied in other laws." 199 Of the three rationales, the
second rationale is the most nebulous and hard to implement. The key to
applying this rationale is to determine a point of reference to measure whether
the decision has become unworkable in the court system. Do you measure the
unworkability of the decision from the Court's point of reference, or the point
of reference of the lower federal courts who are more often confronted with the
court decisions which had carved out an exception to one of the Court's precedents). See
generally Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: JstLiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv 1309 (1995) (arguing that the Court should only look to its
precedent when determining if an intervening development of the law has developed).
195 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173.
196 See supra note 5 (discussing that the Court grants certiorari as a matter of discretion,
not as a matter of right).
197 See supra notes 4-7 (arguing that under the doctrine of stare decisis the Court does
not usually look to lower federal court decisions for guidance).
198 See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983)).
199 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173.
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alleged unworkability everyday 200
The argument for the lower federal courts determining the unworkability of
a decision is that these courts are on the front line of the judiciary and are more
often confronted with the dilemma of unworkable tests, rationales, and
guidelines. Therefore, it is argued that the lower federal courts should be able
to determine whether a Court decision is unworkable and, hence, not protected
by stare decisis.
However, the American common law system is.built upon the foundation
of vertical stare decisis.201 While vertical stare decisis is an important concept,
the Court should consider lower federal court decisions m determining the
unworkability of a Court decision.202
The judicial function exception developed seven years after Bramblett was
decided. 203 Some scholars argue that the early date for the development of an
exception to Bramblett signaled its unworkability 204 However, the Court did
not grant certiorari m Morgan.205 Therefore, one can surmise that the Court
was not concerned that an exception to Bramblett was forged by a lower federal
court.2o6 Furthermore, in subsequent cases developing the judicial function
exception, the Court did not grant certiorari. 207 The Court not granting
certiorari to lower federal court decisions developing the judicial function
exception is not dispositive that the Court thought the Bramblett decision was
200 See cases cited supra note 120 (pointing out that the lower federal courts have
confronted the issue presented m Bramblett many times since the Court's decision m
Bramblet while the Court did not grant certiorari on the issue till forty years after Bramblett
was decided).
201 See Doff, supra note 4, at 2024 (arguing that vertical stare decisis is the linchpin of
the American judicial system); supra note 4 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Continental T.V Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-48 & n.14,
59 (1977) (discussing how lower federal courts had "struggled to distinguish or limit [a
decision of the Court] in ways that [were] a tribute to judicial igenuity" before effectively
overriling that decision); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124-25, 28-29 (1965)
(discussing how lower courts had "quite evidently sought to avoid dealing with [a decision of
the Court] or [had] interpreted it with uncertainty" before effectively overruling that decision).
2 03 See Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
2 04 See generally Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretative Directions m Statutes, 31
HMRV J. ON LGis. 211, 237 n.93 (1994) (arguing that the Bramblett Court did not correctly
interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1001).205 See Morgan v. United States, 373 U.S. 917 (1963).
206 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the dearth of cases that the
Court can grant certiorari in and the danger of inferring that by not granting certiorari the
Court approves of the lower federal court decision); cf. supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2, and I.B.3
(discussing the danger of inferring congressional acquiescence from Congress's iaction). The
two situations are somewhat analogous.207 See cases cited supra note 120.
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workable. However, the inaction by the Court could signal its acquiescence in
the workability of the Bramblett decision "in spite of'208 the judicial function
exception. 209
C. The Third Patterson Rationale
The third Patterson rationale for departing from stare decisis is whether the
decision has become "outdated and after being 'tested by experience, has been
found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare.'" 210
The language of the rationale, whether the decision is "outdated," 211 overlaps
with the workability analysis m Part IV.B.212 Therefore, the focus of
application for the third rationale will be the fairness aspect as denoted by the
language "sense of justice or social welfare. 213
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion discussed whether Bramblett discouraged
trial advocacy 214 Justice Stevens began by analyzing the Morgan court's
opinion's discussion of the potential sweep of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.215 The
Morgan court noted that the statute prohibited concealment and covering up of
material facts, as well as intentional falsehoods, and questioned whether the
statute could be interpreted to criminalize behavior that fell within the
parameters of reasonable trial advocacy 216 However, after raising the specter
that Bramblett unreasonably curtailed trial advocacy, Justice Stevens adopted
the holding of the Morgan court that neither Congress nor the Bramblett Court
intended the statute to preclude reasonable trial advocacy 217
In a more general sense, the requirement that parties not conceal facts or
2 08 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976) (per
curam) (emphasis added). The Court drew the distinction that the statute discriminating
against Mr. Murgia was upheld in spite of 14th Amendment protections not because of 14th
Amendment protections. See it. The language, in spite of not because of, is a useful writing
tool to draw attention to contradistincuons.209 But see supra note 206 and accompanying text.
210 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (quoting Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
211 See id.
212 Whether a decision is outdated is analogous to whether a decision is workable. The
discussion m Part IV.B supports the workability of the Bramblett decision.
213 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174 (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).2 14 See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1758-61 (1995).
215 See itd. at 1761.
216 See Id. at 1762.
217 See it.
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mislead a court does not seem to cut against the gram of justice. 218 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 criminalizes false statements occurring in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department of the United States. 219
The Court m Bramblett held that the word "department," in the statute,
meant the "executive, legislative and judicial branches of government." 220
Therefore, Bramblett's conviction under the statute was affirmed because his
falsehood was directed to an office within the Legislative Branch. 221
Bramblett's defense that he could not be convicted under the statute because his
falsehood was directed to the Legislative Branch rings hollow.222 Analyzed in
light of forty years experience, Bramblett's holding does not seem to be
"inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare." 223
None of the three Patterson rationales for departing from stare decisis lend
support to overruling Bramblett. The first rationale is not triggered because the
Court has had no intervening development of the law affecting Bramblett.224
The second rationale is not invoked because the decision has not become
unworkable. 225 The third rationale is not implicated because the Bramblett
decision is not inucal to fairness and a sense ofjustice.226
None of the three separate opinions m Hubbard applied the Patterson
rationales. 227 However, the Patterson rationales for departing from stare decisis
provide a framework for the Court when analyzing whether to overrule its
earlier precedent. Furthermore, the Patterson rationales allow the Court to
thoroughly analyze different aspects of the earlier precedent and not myopically
focus on one aspect of the precedent. The preceding application of the three
Patterson rationales to the Bramblett precedent at issue in Hubbard strongly
218 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. Justice Scalia states that those persons who told the
truth in reliance on Bramblet have no claim to the Court's solicitude and that those persons
were merely doing what was required of them under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See id. However,
with the Court overruling Bramblett these persons will not now be required to tell the truth m
situations previously covered under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Justice Scalia did not suggest a
solution for this problem.
219 See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955)
220 Id.
221 See Id.
222 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
223 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989); see also supra note
218 and accompanying text.224 See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (Rehnqtust, C.J., dissenting)
(Neither the Court nor Congress has addressed 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in the forty years since
Bramblet was decided.); see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
225 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
226 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
227 See Hubbard, 115 S. CL passim.
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suggests that if the Court had analyzed Bramblett under this framework, then
the Court might have affirmed Bramblett.
V. CONCLUSION
Nineteenth century Great Lakes' navigators relied on the beacon in the
Marblehead Lighthouse2 28 to safely guide them through the tumultuous storms
of Lake Erie and around the treacherous rocks of Marblehead into the calm and
safety of Sandusky Harbor. Likewise, a flexible doctrine of stare decisis has
guided the Court through turbulent times from Plessy v Ferguson229 to Brown
v Board. of Education230 and from Aans v Children's Hospztal 12 to West
Coast Hotel Co. v Parrtsh.232 However, the twentieth century has brought
sophisticated navigational equipment to ships, such as radar and global
positioning systems, as well as improved weather forecasting, alleviating the
need for lighthouses such as Marblehead. While the Marblehead beacon still
shines a path to safety, its heyday is past; does a similar fate await stare
decisiS? 233
The Court by choosing not to apply the three traditional rationales of
Patterson is not being true to the doctrine of stare decisis.234 The recent
decision in Hubbard is a signal to the public that something is amiss. To correct
the situation, the Court needs to follow the three traditional rationales
228 The Marblehead Lighthouse is one of the oldest lighthouses in operation on the Great
Lakes. The lighthouse is located on the shore of Lake Erie in Marblehead, Ohio.
229 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (requmng separate but equal accommodations aboard passenger
trams for African-Americans).
230 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson).
231 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down on constitutional grounds, as an interference
with freedom of contract, a federal statute fixing mmnmum wages for women and children in
the District of Columbia).
232 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Aazns, and m the process Lochner v. New York, 98
U.S. 45 (1905), and holding that freedom of contract is a qualified and not absolute right
because liberty, guaranteed by the Constitution, umplies absence of arbitrary restraint and not
immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions mposed in the interests of the
community).
233 Will stare decisis become a judicial relic, outliving its usefulness but kept around as a
historical reference and teaching guide?
2 34 See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (Justice Stewart writing for the
plurality overruled Branblett, in spite of stare decisis.); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, upheld Roe because of
stare decisis.); see also supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussion of in spite of not
because of language of Murgia).
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formulated in Patterson235 whenever a constitutional or statutory precedent
presents itself for review before the Court.236
With the recent Hubbard decision as a backdrop, the Court is at a
crossroads in the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court can use
the three traditional rationales of Patterson as a beacon to shine light on the
precedent, allowing the Court to determine if the precedent still has vitality
under stare decsis.237 Or the Court, as it did in Hubbard, can decline to apply
the three traditional rationales of Patterson and, thus, examine the precedent in
the dark without the benefit of the light that the Patterson rationales shed on the
issue of stare decisis. Nothing less than the future of the Amencan judicial
system, with peoples' reliance interests and faith in the law being applied
consistently to them now and in the future, hangs in the balance.
235 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (examining three
rationales for departing from stare decisis.); see discussion supra Part IV
236 See Marshall, supra note 4, at 193 (discussing the nportance of the Court's
statutory stare decisis analysis as a guide to the lower federal courts).237 See discussion supra Part IV
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